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Learners frequently experience uncertainty about how to proceed during learning. These 
experiences cause learners to enter a state of cognitive disequilibrium and its affiliated 
affective state of confusion. Cognitive disequilibrium and confusion have been found to 
frequently occur during complex learning and provide opportunities for deeper learning. 
In the current thesis, a learning environment that induces confusion was investigated. In 
the environment, learners engaged in a dialogue on scientific reasoning with an animated 
pedagogical agent. Confusion was induced through false feedback provided by the tutor 
agent (e.g., when learners responded correctly and were told their response was 
incorrect). Self-reports of confusion during the training session indicated that false 
feedback was an effective method for inducing confusion. False feedback was also found 
to increase learners’ ability to apply this knowledge to new and novel situations, under 
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No one wants to be confused. In fact, most people do not even want to admit that 
they are confused because confusion is often viewed as revealing a shortcoming or 
failure. Recent research, however, has found that increased occurrences of confusion 
during learning are often tied to deeper comprehension (Craig, Graesser, Sullins, & 
Gholson, 2004; D’Mello & Graesser, in review; D’Mello, Lehman, Pekrun, & Graesser, 
in review; Graesser, Chipman, King, McDaniel, & D’Mello, 2007; Lehman et al., 2011; 
Lehman, D’Mello, & Graesser, in press). It is proposed, however, that it is not the actual 
occurrence of confusion that promotes deeper learning, but rather the cognitive activities 
that confusion reflects or triggers (Brown & VanLehn, 1980; VanLehn, Siler, Murray, 
Yamauchi, & Baggett, 2003).  
Confusion has been found to be diagnostic of cognitive disequilibrium, which 
occurs when a person is confronted with system breakdowns, anomalies, contradictions, 
impasses, and uncertainty about how to proceed (Brown & VanLehn, 1980; Caroll & 
Kay, 1988; VanLehn et al., 2003). Once cognitive disequilibrium and confusion have 
occurred, learners engage in effortful problem solving activities to resolve disequilibrium 
and return to a state of equilibrium. It is this effortful reasoning and problem solving that 
can produce deeper learning depending on whether confusion has been resolved or not 
(D’Mello et al., in review; D’Mello & Graesser, in review; VanLehn et al., 2003).  
So how can learning technologies capitalize on the relationship between 
confusion and learning? One strategy is to take advantage of the instances of confusion 
that naturally arise during learning activities. When confusion occurs, learning 
technologies can scaffold learning during this affective state in much the same manner 
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that these systems already scaffold learners’ cognitive states. For example, a learning 
technology can respond differently when a learner is incorrect and confused compared to 
when a learner is incorrect but not confused. In fact, some learning technologies already 
exist that adaptively respond to learners’ emotional states when they arise during learning 
(D’Mello, Craig, Fike, & Graesser, 2009; Litman & Forbes-Riley, 2006). A second 
strategy is to induce the states of cognitive disequilibrium and confusion during learning. 
For example, if a learner has a previously held misconception, the ITS can induce 
confusion by forcing the learner to confront and eventually correct this erroneous belief. 
It is this latter strategy that will be investigated in this thesis.  
Emotions and Learning 
Whereas folklore psychology considers cognition and emotion as either opposing 
processes or disparate parts of mental functioning, a preponderance of research has 
shown that cognition and emotion are inextricably linked (Barrett, Mesquita, Ochsner, & 
Gross, 2007; Bower, 1981; Csikszentmihalyi, 1990; Dagleish & Power, 1999; Lazarus, 
1999; Mandler, 1984; Ortony, Clore, & Collins, 1988; Scherer, Schorr, & Johnstone, 
2001; Stein & Levine, 1991). In fact, it has been suggested that cognitive processes such 
as memory, reasoning, and deliberation all involve the experience of emotion  (Stein, 
Hernandez, & Trabasso, 2008). For example, attempts to suppress emotional states can 
have negative consequences for the memory of important details (Richards & Gross, 
1999). It could be argued that an adequate understanding of any cognitive process 
requires an understanding of the emotions that accompany the cognitive process. 
In the last decade, there has been an increase of research on the specific emotions 
that occur during complex learning. One general conclusion from this line of research has 
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been that it is not Ekman’s (1973) six “basic” emotions (anger, disgust, fear, happiness, 
sadness, and surprise) that occur during learning, but rather it is emotions that are more 
specific to the learning context that frequently occur (Craig et al., 2004; D’Mello et al., 
2006; Dragon et al., 2008; Graesser et al., 2007; Kort, Reilly, & Picard, 2001; 
McQuiggan & Lester, 2009; Pekrun, 2010; Woolf et al., 2009).  
Emotions that are specific to learning have been identified in a variety of contexts, 
from learning across an entire semester (Pekrun, 2010) to shorter learning sessions (30 
minutes to 1.5 hours) (Arroyo et al., 2009; Burleson & Picard, 2007; Chaffar, Derbali, & 
Frasson, 2009; Conati & Maclaren, 2009; D’Mello et al., 2009; Forbes-Riley & Litman, 
2009; Robison, McQuiggan, & Lester, 2009). Pekrun and colleagues have identified a set 
of academic emotions that occur across a variety of activities over the course of a 
semester or entire year of school. These emotions are associated with  (a) outcomes 
(achievement, e.g., contentment, anxiety, and frustration), (b) different topics (topic, e.g., 
empathy for the protagonist in a novel), (c) interpersonal interactions (social, e.g., pride, 
shame, and jealousy), (d) and new information (epistemic, e.g., surprise and confusion). 
 Research on shorter learning sessions (30 minutes to 1.5 hours) has revealed a 
second set of learning-centered emotions. The learning-centered emotions include some 
of the academic emotions identified by Pekrun and colleagues, along with some 
additional emotions. These learning-centered emotions include anxiety, boredom, 
confusion, curiosity, engagement/flow, frustration, happiness, delight, and surprise 
(Calvo & D’Mello, 2011; Rodrigo & Baker, 2011a). The current thesis focuses on this set 
of learning-centered emotions and shorter learning sessions. Investigations of learner 
emotional experiences within different ITSs and serious games have shown that these-
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learning centered emotions are prevalent (Baker, D’Mello, Rodrigo, & Graesser, 2010; 
Craig et al., 2004; D’Mello et al., 2006; D’Mello & Graesser, 2011; Graesser et al., 2007; 
McQuiggan, Robison, & Lester, 2010; Rodrigo & Baker, 2011a; 2011b). The learning-
centered emotions were also found to be prevalent during one-to-one human tutoring 
sessions, with confusion being the most prevalent emotion (Lehman et al., 2008).   
Research on emotions while interacting with an ITS called AutoTutor (Graesser et 
al., 2004) indicated that the most frequently occurring emotions were the learning-
centered emotions (Craig et al., 2004; D’Mello et al., 2006; Graesser et al., 2007) and 
found that these emotions were differentially related to learning outcomes. Boredom and 
frustration were found to be negatively correlated with learning outcomes, whereas 
confusion and flow were positively related to learning while interacting with AutoTutor 
(Craig et al., 2004; D’Mello et al., 2006; Graesser et al., 2007). Although confusion and 
flow were found to be positively correlated with learning, there have been few 
investigations into the causal links between these emotional states and learning outcomes 
(D’Mello et al., in review; Lehman et al., in press). 
 Emotional experience is an integral part of complex learning but it is not the case 
that all emotions facilitate learning. Emotions such as anxiety and boredom impede 
learning by reducing motivation and engagement (Kort et al., 2001; Snow, Corno, & 
Jackson, 1996). Many traditional theories of emotion and learning posited that 
negatively-valenced emotions hinder learning whereas positively-valenced emotions 
promote learning, but contemporary empirical evidence demonstrates that this is not 
always the case (Allen & Carifio, 1995; Craig et al., 2004; D’Mello et al., 2006; Graesser 
et al., 2007; Spering, Wagener, & Funke, 2005). Instead, it appears that there are cases in 
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which both positive and negative emotions can facilitate learning. For example, positive 
affect has been found to increase flexibility and creative thinking (Fielder, 2001; Isen, 
2001; Isen, Daubman, & Nowicki, 1987). Negative affect, on the other hand, has been 
associated with a more narrow, but methodical approach to assessing the problem and 
finding the solution (Bless & Fielder, 1995; Hertel, Neuhof, Theuer, & Kerr, 2000; 
Schwarz, 1990; 2000). Confusion is one such negative emotion that has been positively 
correlated with learning (Craig et al., 2004; D’Mello & Graesser, 2011; Graesser et al., 
2007). It is important to note that both approaches (i.e., creative or methodical thinking) 
to problem solving can be effective or ineffective depending on the nature of the task.  
 While empirical research has attempted to identify the emotions that occur during 
learning, there are also several theories that have been proposed that predict the emotions 
that will occur during learning, decision-making, and effortful problem solving. Flow 
theory (Csikszentmihalyi, 1990) focuses on the level of engagement during the learning 
process. There are two conditions necessary for flow to occur. The first condition is that 
there needs to be a perceived challenge that pushes the learner’s skill level, without being 
so challenging that the learner cannot complete the task. Thus, it is an interaction between 
learners’ skill level and the challenge presented by the task. The second condition is that 
a clear goal and immediate feedback about progress toward that goal is available. Thus, 
learners experience flow when they are presented with a clear goal, are sufficiently 
challenged but not to the point of bewilderment, and receive feedback on their 
performance. Conversely, flow theory predicts that when learners are not sufficiently 
challenged by the learning task, are given a task that is too easy given their current skill 
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level, or are not sure of the current goal, they will transition to disengagement or 
boredom. 
  Another theory that predicts the occurrence of different emotions during complex 
cognitive tasks is goal-appraisal theory (Scherer et al., 2001; Stein & Levine, 1991). 
Goal-appraisal theory predicts different affective responses based on progression towards 
achieving a goal. During a complex task like learning, learners generate goals and sub-
goals that they want to achieve. For example, a learner may have the superordinate goal 
of getting an A in a physics class, which will generate sub-goals to understand 
mechanics, electricity, thermodynamics, etc. When working towards achieving a goal or 
sub-goal, events can occur that will either facilitate or interfere with goal achievement. 
Events can range from internal (learner realizes a new method to solve a problem) to 
external (teacher provides a helpful hint) events that occur during the learning process. In 
general, events that facilitate goal achievement are expected to produce positively-
valenced emotions (e.g., happiness) and events that impede goal achievement are 
expected to produce negatively-valenced emotions (e.g., frustration or sadness). 
However, the intensity of the emotional experience is determined by the degree to which 
an event impacts goal achievement. An event viewed as a minor aid to achieving a goal 
might bring on mild feelings of satisfaction, whereas an event that reveals the correct 
solution to a difficult problem may induce joy or eureka. 
 Goal-blocking events bring about a variety of emotional experiences that vary in 
intensity as well as the availability of a plan to circumvent the current obstacle (Stein & 
Levine, 1991; Stein, Trabasso, & Liwag, 1993). When goal achievement is blocked there 
are two possible situations. In one situation, the learner is aware of an available plan to 
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continue working towards the intended goal. This type of obstacle might produce a state 
of mild irritation due to the temporary nature of the impediment. The other situation is 
when an inhibitory event has occurred and there is no available plan. An obstacle of this 
nature is likely to evoke stronger emotions that may further prevent a person from 
engaging in effective problem solving. In summary, relevance of events to current goals 
and appraisals of plan availability, ultimately determines the emotional experience.  
Confusion and Learning 
As highlighted above, confusion is a state that has been found to frequently occur 
during learning, is tied to the learning process, and is correlated with deep learning. 
Confusion has been defined in a variety of ways across previous research: an emotion 
(Rozin & Cohen, 2003), a knowledge emotion (Silvia, 2010), an epistemic emotion 
(Pekrun & Stephens, in press), an affective state that is not an emotion (Keltner & Shiota, 
2003), and a cognitive state (Clore & Huntsinger, 2007). The present thesis takes the 
point of view that confusion is an epistemic or knowledge emotion (Pekrun & Stephens, 
in press; Silvia, 2010). Confusion emerges when an impasse has been reached, either 
through a contradiction, anomaly, system breakdown, error, or when there is uncertainty 
about how to proceed. These events elicit confusion because they represent a discrepancy 
between the learner’s knowledge and the information being presented. When impasses 
are detected, learners are placed in a state of cognitive disequilibrium (Bjork & Linn, 
2006; Festinger, 1957; Graesser et al., 2005; Piaget, 1952). It is assumed that there is a 
natural desire to be in a state of cognitive equilibrium, so when disequilibrium occurs, 
effortful problem solving and deliberation begin. Learners who do not attempt to restore 
equilibrium are likely to disengage from the task. This effort to restore equilibrium results 
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in greater effort and engagement in problem solving and reasoning, both of which can 
lead to increased learning (Brown & VanLehn, 1980; Caroll & Kay, 1988; Graesser & 
Olde, 2003; Siegler & Jenkins, 1989; VanLehn et al., 2003). A learning environment that 
can take advantage of these cognitive benefits of impasses, cognitive disequilibrium, and 
confusion would promote deep learning of conceptual information (D’Mello & Graesser, 
2012). 
 The mere occurrence of impasses, cognitive disequilibrium, and confusion is not 
expected to result in increased learning (VanLehn et al., 2003). According to impasse-
driven theories of learning, deep learning results from the cognitive activities (i.e., 
effortful elaboration and causal reasoning during problem solving) associated with 
impasse resolution (D’Mello & Graesser, in review; Graesser et al., 2007). These 
cognitive activities emerge from desirable difficulties (Bjork & Linn, 2006). An analysis 
of over 100 hours of human-human tutorial dialogues supported the benefits of impasse 
resolution (VanLehn et al., 2003). Comprehension of physics concepts was rare when 
learners did not reach an impasse, irrespective of the quality of explanations provided by 
the tutor. The act of resolving desirable difficulties has been found to increase depth of 
processing as well as more successful memory retrieval (Craik & Lockhart, 1972; Craik 
& Tulving, 1972).  
 While it may seem intuitive for a learning environment to minimize the 
occurrence of confusion and help the learner immediately resolve any occurrence of 
confusion, the current thesis proposes a different perspective. Given the productive 
activities initiated by impasses, cognitive disequilibrium, and confusion, the current 
thesis suggests encouraging and scaffolding the occurrence of these states. Recent 
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research has had some success at inducing cognitive disequilibrium and confusion during 
learning through the presentation of system breakdowns (D’Mello & Graesser, in review) 
and contradictory information (D’Mello et al., in review; Lehman et al., 2011). This 
research is briefly reviewed below. 
 In two experiments D’Mello and Graesser (in review) induced impasses, 
cognitive disequilibrium, and confusion through device breakdowns. In these 
experiments participants were first presented an illustrated text of a device (e.g., a 
cylinder lock) and given 1.5 minutes (Experiment 1) to 2 minutes (Experiment 2) to study 
how the device worked. Participants were then presented with the same illustrated text 
and an additional prompt. This additional prompt described some type of breakdown that 
had occurred in the device (experimental condition). The cylinder lock, for example, had 
the following breakdown prompt: “A person puts the key into the lock and turns the lock 
but the bolt doesn’t move. Try to understand what is wrong with the cylinder lock.” 
(D’Mello & Graesser, in review). Participants were then given an additional 1.5 to 2 
minutes to try to determine why the device was not functioning. In Experiment 1, the 
participants in the control condition simply re-read the illustrated text. In Experiment 2 
participants in the control condition were presented with the same illustrated text with an 
additional prompt to focus on a key component of the device. Participants studied four 
devices over the course of the learning session.  
 Confusion was measured in two ways. First, participants rated their confusion 
level with an online affective questionnaire at multiple points during the session. Second, 
participants engaged in a retrospective confusion judgment protocol (Graesser et al., 
2006) after viewing all four devices. Participants watched a video of their face and were 
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provided with the illustrated text for the device viewed at that time (i.e., context) and 
made periodic confusion ratings on a scale of zero to 10. Breakdown scenarios were 
found to induce greater levels of confusion. It was also found that participants with 
higher aptitude, as measured by SAT scores, were more likely to resolve occurrences of 
cognitive disequilibrium and confusion. Participants who resolved or partially-resolved 
their confusion displayed better understanding of device functioning than those who did 
not resolve their confusion. 
 The second set of experiments (Experiments 1, 2, 3) induced confusion with 
contradictions presented by two animated pedagogical agents (D’Mello et al., in review; 
Lehman et al., 2011). The tutor agent guided the student agent and human learner through 
the learning session, while the student agent served as a peer learner. In all three 
experiments, the tutor and student agents discussed scientific reasoning topics with the 
human learners (e.g., control group, experimenter bias). Each topic was discussed in the 
context of a research case study with a trialogue (i.e., conversation among the human, 
tutor, and student agents) that evaluated the scientific merits of the case study. One study, 
for example, discussed the testing of a new miracle diet pill. Although the case study 
claimed that the diet pill was extremely effective, the study was flawed because the 
control group was inappropriate.  
All three experiments included four conditions that varied the presentation of 
contradictory information. In the true-true condition, the tutor agent presented a correct 
claim and the student agent agreed with the tutor (control condition). In the true-false 
condition, the tutor presented a correct opinion and the student agent disagreed by 
presenting an incorrect opinion. In contrast, it was the student agent who provided the 
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correct opinion and the tutor agent who disagreed by providing an incorrect opinion in 
the false-true condition. Finally in the false-false condition, the tutor agent provided an 
incorrect opinion and the student agent agreed with this incorrect opinion. After both 
agents had asserted their opinions, the learner was invited to state whether the study was 
or was not flawed by providing responses to forced-choice questions throughout the 
trialogue. 
 Learners discussed the scientific merits of eight studies with the two pedagogical 
agents for Experiments 1 and 2 and four studies for Experiment 3. Learners then 
completed a retrospective affect judgment (Graesser et al., 2006) in which they viewed 
synchronized videos of their face and screen from their interactions with the two agents 
(Experiments 1 and 2). Confusion and uncertainty were measured by learners’ self-
reported confusion levels via the retrospective affect judgment protocol (Experiments 1 
and 2) and their responses to forced-choice questions during the interaction (Experiments 
1-3). Self-reported confusion levels indicated that more confusion occurred in the true-
false and false-true (Experiments 1 and 2) conditions when compared to the true-true 
condition (control). Learner responses revealed greater uncertainty in all three 
experimental conditions (true-false, false-true, false-false) when compared to the control 
condition (true-true).  
Experiences of confusion and uncertainty were tied to increased learning in all 
three experiments. Specifically, learners in the false-true condition (Experiments 1 and 2) 
and the true-false (Experiment 2 only) conditions that reported more confusion 
performed better on an assessment of scientific reasoning skills compared to the no-
contradiction control condition. In addition, Experiment 3 revealed that learner 
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performance on forced-choice questions during the trialogue was related to learner 
performance on transfer tasks that required the diagnosis of flaws in case studies. 
Specifically, learners who displayed uncertainty (i.e., responded incorrectly) performed 
better on transfer tasks.  
When combined with the findings from the device breakdown studies, these 
results indicate that confusion can be induced during learning with some success and that 
both the presence and resolution of confusion were diagnostic of improved performance 
on subsequent knowledge tests. This thesis expanded upon this past research by exploring 
a new medium for confusion induction and its subsequent impact on learning. 
Specifically, the focus was on the impact of system feedback as a method of confusion 
induction. Before the current research is discussed, some discussion is needed on past 
research on feedback during learning. 
Feedback and Learning 
Feedback is an important part of the learning process because it affirms accurate 
knowledge and corrects error-ridden knowledge for learners (Albertson, 1986; Azevedo 
& Bernard, 1995). However, despite all of the research conducted on the different aspects 
of feedback and how each impacts learning, there have not been consistent findings that 
one type of feedback (e.g., elaborated or delayed) increases learning (for reviews of 
research see Kluger & DeNisi, 1996; Shute, 2008). Some elements of feedback have been 
found to be detrimental to learning: when feedback is perceived as criticizing or 
controlling (Baron, 1993; Fedor, Davis, Maslyn, & Mathieson, 2001), when feedback 
compares learners to peers, when feedback is vague (Butler, 1987; McColskey & Leary, 
1985), and when feedback interrupts the flow of active problem solving (Corno & Snow, 
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1986). The contradictory findings about feedback warrant further research into the 
different feedback characteristics and how each one impacts learning.  
 The majority of research on feedback has followed three main strands: timing, 
directness, and elaboration. The driving question for feedback timing is whether 
immediate or delayed feedback better promotes learning. Research supporting delayed 
presentation of feedback claims that the delay allows for continued problem solving 
without interruption, allowing for learners to self-correct and achieve a deeper 
understanding of the material (Kulhavy & Anderson, 1972; Surber & Anderson, 1975). 
However, research on an ITS, the ACT Programming Tutor, has shown that immediate 
feedback is more beneficial for promoting learning (Anderson, Corbett, Koedinger, & 
Pelletier, 1995). It may be the case that immediate versus delayed feedback are suited to 
different tasks, but further experimentation is required to resolve this. 
 The second strand is the degree to which feedback is delivered directly to 
learners. Directness of feedback refers to how explicitly a tutor delivers feedback stating 
that the learner response is correct or incorrect. It has been proposed that expert human 
tutors use indirect feedback while interacting with learners (Lepper & Woolverton, 2002; 
Merrill, Reiser, Ranney, & Trafton, 1992). This claim means that expert tutors minimize 
providing feedback on the quality of learners’ responses. Instead, these tutors allow 
learners to find the correct answer on their own with the tutor’s support but not 
evaluation. However, there is also evidence that expert human tutors do provide direct, 
immediate feedback to learners during the tutoring sessions (D’Mello, Lehman, & 
Person, 2010). Direct feedback may be the most effective for novice learners (Knoblauch 
& Brannon, 1981; Moreno, 2004).  
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 The third strand of research has focused on the complexity and amount of 
information delivered with feedback. Feedback can range from simply correct/incorrect 
to an elaborated explanation of why one option is correct. Although it may seem obvious 
that the longer explanation would most benefit learning, the findings are varied (Shute, 
2008). Elaborated feedback has the advantage of specificity (Bangert-Drowns, Kulik, 
Kulik, & Morgan, 1991; Pridemore & Klein, 1995). By specifying the reasons for why a 
response is correct or incorrect learners are not left with feelings of uncertainty about 
how to use the feedback (Fedor, 1991). However, feedback that is less elaborate can be 
effective as well (Kulhavy, White, Topp, Chan, & Adams, 1985). Feedback that contains 
too much information has the potential liability of losing focus and increasing 
interference for the learner. In other research, there has been no difference between 
simple and complex feedback in terms of learning (Schimmel, 1983; Sleeman, Kelly, 
Martinak, Ward, & Moore, 1989). 
 A fourth aspect of feedback that has been largely ignored by previous research 
pertains to feedback accuracy. Specifically, there has been a paucity of research 
investigating the differential impacts of accurate versus inaccurate feedback on learning 
(for exceptions, see D’Mello et al., 2011 and Miller, 2010 for uses of the false feedback 
paradigm within problem solving). Based on past research, there seems to be an 
assumption that feedback should be accurate; it is just the method of delivery that is 
somewhat debated. Research on inaccurate feedback has mainly been limited to false 
feedback on personality assessments (e.g., Harris & Greene, 1984; McFarlane, Polivy, & 
Herman, 1998) and false physiological feedback (e.g., heart rate, weight) (e.g., Borkovec 
& Glasgow, 1973; Davies, 1994). False feedback on physiological measures has been 
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used help people cope with extreme emotions (Borkovec & Glasgow, 1973; Karsdorp, 
Kindt, Rietveld, Everaerd, & Mulder, 2009; Russell & Davey, 1991), phobias (Ehlers, 
Margraf, Roth, Taylor et al., 1988; Story & Craske, 2008; Wild, Clark, Ehlers, & 
McManus, 2008), and dysfunctional sexual behavior (McCall & Meston, 2007; Palace, 
1995; Stone, Clark, Sbrocco, & Lewis, 2009). However, in each of these cases, learning 
is operationalized as the correction of deviant or maladaptive behavior and not creating or 
modifying existing mental models of complex topics.  
The question arises as to why or how false feedback would be implemented in a 
learning environment.  It seems intuitive that any feedback provided to the learner should 
be accurate. Otherwise, there is the potential to prolong or strengthen misconceptions 
help by the learner (Roediger, 1974; Roediger & Neely, 1982; Roediger, Stellon, & 
Tulving, 1977). However, there is some evidence from research on peer feedback that 
suggests inaccurate feedback may not always be detrimental to learning (Gielen, Peeters, 
Dochy, Onghena, & Struyven, 2010; Van Steendam, Rijlaarsdam, Sercu, & Van den 
Burgh, 2010; Yang, Badger, & Yu, 2006). Peer feedback can frequently be inaccurate 
due to the knowledge gaps and misconceptions held by peer learners. In some cases, 
inaccurate feedback may actually be beneficial for learning because it creates uncertainty, 
which triggers the learner to reflect and think more deeply about the material (Gielen et 
al., 2010; Yang et al., 2006). These findings suggest that, under the certain circumstances, 
inaccurate feedback could potentially be utilized to promote learning. 
Overview of Present Research and Hypotheses 
Previous research on peer feedback has found that inaccurate feedback may be 
successful because it places learners into a state of uncertainty, which causes deeper 
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reflection and processing (Gielen et al., 2010; Yang et al., 2006). This hypothesis is 
consistent with cognitive disequilibrium theory, which proposes that uncertainty about 
how to proceed is caused by reaching an impasse and indicative of experiences of 
confusion and cognitive disequilibrium (Bjork & Linn, 2006; Festinger, 1957; Graesser et 
al., 2005; Piaget, 1952). Along these lines and to build on previous confusion induction 
research, the current thesis investigated the effects of confusion during learning by 
inducing confusion through another medium: system feedback. Whereas most learning 
environments use feedback to adaptively respond to the quality of learners’ responses, the 
current thesis suggests a different use for feedback. The hypothesis is that providing 
inaccurate feedback would induce confusion in learners in the same manner that was 
previously discussed for device breakdowns and contradictions. Inaccurate feedback 
could create confusion as well by creating increased feelings of uncertainty about how to 
proceed.  
 When learners are informed that a response is incorrect, they must reevaluate and 
engage in active problem solving to revise existing mental models. But what would occur 
if negative feedback were provided to correct responses? Would this discrepancy in the 
mental model trigger confusion? And, if confusion were induced, would the learner 
actively try to resolve the confusion, thereby reaching a deeper level of understanding? 
This thesis attempts to answer these questions. Specifically, are there are situations in 
which inaccurate feedback is more beneficial to learning because of the possible 
induction of confusion.  
 The current thesis investigated the potential of inaccurate feedback to improve 
deep learning by testing the effects of feedback (accurate and inaccurate) when learners 
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evaluated the scientific merits of research case studies. Critical evaluation of case studies 
involves scientific reasoning skills such as stating hypotheses, identifying dependent and 
independent variables, isolating potential confounds in designs, and determining if data 
support predictions (Halpern, 2003; Roth et al, 2006). Learners engaged in dialogues with 
an animated pedagogical agent in which they received feedback (accurate or inaccurate) 
on the quality of their evaluation of the case study. 
The current thesis hypothesized that inaccurate feedback could serve as the 
catalyst to induce confusion during learning (false feedback hypothesis). For any given 
question, learners could answer either correctly or incorrectly and the tutor agent could 
provide positive or negative feedback, that is, either accurate or inaccurate. Table 1 
depicts the possible combinations of answer quality and feedback as well as the predicted 
level of induced confusion. The current thesis predicted that the two inaccurate feedback 
conditions were not likely to result in the same degree of confusion. In the correct-
negative condition, learners would experience an obstacle to the goal of successfully 
answering the question, as well as experiencing uncertainty about how to proceed. 
Although this may seem to imply that all instances of negative feedback would induce 
confusion, this is not necessarily the case. For example, if a learner responded incorrectly 
there may not be the same expectation for positive feedback. In other words, learners’ 
confidence that their response was correct would influence whether accurate, negative 
feedback induced confusion. The other inaccurate feedback condition, incorrect-positive, 






Predictions Based on Answer Quality and Feedback Type 
 
      
Answer Quality Feedback Type Predicted Confusion 
   
      
Correct Positive None 
Correct Negative Full 
Incorrect Positive Some 
Incorrect Negative Some or None 
      
 
 Accurate feedback, on the other hand, was not expected to induce confusion to the 
same degree as inaccurate feedback, if at all. A correct response coupled with positive 
feedback was not expected to result in an experience of confusion. However, when 
negative feedback was delivered after an incorrect response, confusion may be present, 
depending on learners’ confidence in their response.  
As mentioned previously, learners’ can be confident or not confident in the 
correctness of their response prior to receiving feedback. Learners’ confidence can 
impact their expectation for positive feedback. This impact on learners’ expectations is 
likely to influence the effectiveness of false feedback as a method for confusion 
induction. For example, a learner who is incorrect, but confident in the correctness of 
their response will expect positive feedback. Thus, even though the negative feedback is 
accurate, it violates the learner’s expectation and the accurate feedback may trigger a 
state of confusion for the learner. The current thesis hypothesized that answer confidence 
would moderate the effect of inaccurate feedback on confusion induction (confidence 
moderation hypothesis).  
There are four combinations of confidence level, answer quality, and feedback 
type that were not expected to result in confusion. Each combination involved an 
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alignment between learners’ expectations and the resulting feedback. In other words, 
learners were confident that their answer was correct and receive positive feedback or 
they were not confident and received negative feedback. Confusion was expected to 
occur when there was not alignment between learners’ expectations and the feedback 
received. 
 Confusion was expected to be maximized when learners were confident in their 
answer and received negative feedback because this violates expectations. Providing 
negative feedback when participants are confident and answer correctly is expected to 
trigger a discrepancy in their mental models and trigger confusion. Significant confusion 
was also expected when negative feedback is provided to learners who are confident but 
answer incorrectly.  
 Providing positive feedback when participants are not confident in their responses 
is another situation where expectations and feedback do not align because there is a 
violation of expectations. That is, they expect negative or neutral feedback irrespective of 
answer quality because they lack confidence in their responses. However, the level of 
confusion is not expected to be as intense, if it occurs at all, as in the previous case with 
negative feedback because unexpected positive feedback might induce a positive 
emotional state. 
 Last, the current thesis hypothesized that once confusion has occurred, it will 
trigger beneficial cognitive activities (e.g., reflection, problem solving) and the 
occurrence of these cognitive activities will facilitate learning (facilitative confusion 
hypothesis). Although cognitive disequilibrium, confusion, and impasses have been 
associated with learning gains (Brown & VanLehn, 1980; Caroll & Kay, 1988; Graesser 
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& Olde, 2003; Siegler & Jenkins, 1989; VanLehn et al., 2003), it is the beneficial 
cognitive activities (reflection, deliberation, etc.) that they trigger that are ostensibly 
linked to deeper learning. Hence, the facilitative confusion hypothesis predicts that once 
confusion has occurred, learners would begin to actively reason and engage in problem 
solving activities in an effort to restore equilibrium, and would reach a deeper level of 
understanding. Although it seems plausible that learners must resolve their confusion to 
achieve deep learning, there is some evidence that partial-resolution (D’Mello & 
Graesser, in review) or simply engaging in the cognitive activities triggered by confusion 
(D’Mello et al., in review) can result in deep learning. Thus, the experience of confusion, 
regardless of resolution, was also hypothesized to facilitate learning. 
Method 
Participants and Design 
There were 167 participants in the experiment. Participants (called learners for the 
remainder of the paper) were undergraduate students from a midsouth university in the 
US who received course credit for participation. The experiment had a within-subjects 
design with four conditions (correct-positive, correct-negative, incorrect-negative, 
incorrect-positive), discussed further below. Learners completed two sessions in which 
they received accurate feedback and two sessions in which they received inaccurate 
feedback. However, due to the fact that condition assignment was partially dependent 
upon learner responses, it was not guaranteed that each learner would experience all four 
conditions. Order of conditions (accurate vs. inaccurate feedback) and topics and 






Confusion was experimentally induced with a false feedback manipulation over 
the course of learning scientific reasoning topics (e.g., random assignment, replication). 
This was achieved by having an animated pedagogical agent (tutor) ask the learner a 
forced-choice question. Then the tutor agent provided the learner with inaccurate 
feedback. Inaccurate feedback was expected to trigger conflict and force the learner to 
reflect, deliberate, and decide whether his or her initial response was correct. 
 Inaccurate feedback was delivered during a dialogue in which flaws in case 
studies were identified. All studies contained subtle methodological flaws. There were 
four feedback conditions based on learners’ answer quality (correct, incorrect) and the 
tutor agent’s feedback (positive: “Yes, that’s right,” negative: “No, that’s not right.”). 
Learners who responded correctly to the forced-choice question either received accurate, 
positive feedback (correct-positive) or inaccurate, negative feedback (correct-negative). 
In the other two conditions learners had responded incorrectly. Learners in the incorrect-
negative condition received accurate, negative feedback, whereas those in the incorrect-
positive condition received inaccurate, positive feedback. The accurate feedback 
conditions (correct-positive and incorrect-negative) served as the control conditions. 
Knowledge Tests 
In all knowledge tests, the current experiment focused on four scientific reasoning 
topics: control group, experimenter bias, random assignment, and replication. There were 
two types of tests used to assess scientific reasoning knowledge. First, learners’ 
knowledge of the definition of each topic was assessed. This assessment was presented 
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before and after all of the training sessions had been completed, pretest and posttest, 
respectively. Two versions of the test were created and order of presentation was 
counterbalanced across learners. Each test version consisted of eight four-foil multiple-
choice questions. There was one question pertaining to each topic and four questions that 
pertained to four additional topics that were not covered in the session (construct validity, 
correlational studies, generalizability, measurement quality).  
The second knowledge assessment required learners to evaluate the scientific 
merit of case studies. Learners were presented with new case studies (i.e., not discussed 
during the training sessions) and asked to diagnose any potential flaws in the 
methodology. For each case study, learners selected from eight options (four topics and 
four distractor topics) to label as flawed or not flawed, as well as the option to indicate 
that the study was not flawed. In truth, each study had one flaw. Learners were presented 
with near and far transfer studies (see Appendix A). The near transfer studies differed 
from the studies discussed in the training sessions on surface features, whereas the far 
transfer studies differed on both surface and structural features. For example, a surface 
feature difference could be taking a diet pill (original study) versus an acne pill (near 
transfer study), whereas structural feature differences could be experimental-do nothing 
control groups (original study) versus 3 or more comparison groups all receiving some 
type of treatment (far transfer study). Each topic had a near and far transfer study, 
resulting in four near transfer and four far transfer studies. This assessment was only 






Each training session consisted of four phases: (1) manipulation, (2) probe, (3) 
remediation, and (4) post-remediation. The manipulation phase began with a description 
of the topic (e.g., experimenter bias) and the case study that was being discussed. For 
example, in Table 2, dialogue turns one through seven represent the manipulation phase. 
The excerpt in Table 2 is an example dialogue between the tutor agent (Dr. Smith) and 
the human learner (Bob) from the correct-negative condition. Dr. Smith and Bob are 
discussing a case study that has experimenter bias as its flaw. Learners read the study and 
then were presented with the first forced-choice question of the training session. Forced-
choice questions consisted of three response options: target, thematic miss, and distractor 
(see Table 2). The target was the correct answer option, whereas the thematic miss and 
distractor were both incorrect. The thematic miss was an option that was related to the 
topic, but was not actually related to the question, whereas the distractor was not at all 
related to the topic of the question.  
After being presented with the forced-choice question (turn 1), learners delivered 
a response (turn 2) and the tutor agent provided feedback about the quality of the 
response (turn 3). Prior to receiving feedback, learners were asked to indicate whether 
they were confident or not confident in the correctness of their response (not shown). 
Learners were given the opportunity to either change their response (not confident) or 
stay with the same response option originally selected (confident). The manipulation 
phase was the only phase of the training session in which learners received feedback 
about the quality of their responses. The feedback delivered could either be accurate or 
inaccurate, regardless of the actual quality of the response.  
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After receiving feedback, learners were then prompted by the tutor agent to 
indicate when they were ready to continue with the training session. This response time 























Table 2  
Example Dialogue Excerpt from Correct-Inaccurate Condition 
 
Turn Speaker Dialogue 
   
Half of the autistic children at a therapy center received the facilitated communication 
treatment and half didn't. Researchers who had been working with these kids wanted to 
see if the treatment worked. So they ran a study to test it. They stood nearby while the 
kids wrote about a happy experience so that they could encourage them to write 
until the kids wrote four sentences. The researchers found that the facilitated 
communication treatment did work. <Case study> 
   
1 Dr. 
Smith 
Bob, could the researchers have behaved in a way that 
influenced the results? <Forced-choice question> 
A. behaved differently with students that received or didn't receive treatment <Target> 
B. received training, so they all behaved the same in all experiments <Thematic Miss> 
C. it doesn't matter, it won't have an effect on the results <Distractor> 
2 Bob A <Correct response> 
3 Dr. 
Smith 




Bob, type OK when you're ready to keep going. <Feedback 
response prompt> 
5 Bob ok <Feedback response latency measure> 
6 Dr. 
Smith 
Bob, would your classmates be confused by this stuff? 
<Confusion prompt> 
7 Bob confused <Self-reported confusion> 
   
   
Half of the students in a learning disability class received the test-taking pro treatment 
and half didn't. The researchers that developed it worked with these students. They 
wanted to see if the treatment really worked, so they ran a study to evaluate it. All of 
the students took a test. The researchers wanted to have the same amount of data 
for each student, so they stood nearby to answer any questions. The researchers 
found that the test-taking pro treatment did work. <Near transfer case study> 
   
8 Dr. 
Smith 
Bob, could the researchers' behavior have influenced the results? 
<Forced-choice question> 
9 Bob B <Incorrect response> 
   
   
One of the easiest factors of the environment to control is the effect of the researcher. 
We know from several experiments, that the behavior or expectations of a researcher 
can have a significant impact on the results of an experiment....<Explanatory text>                                                    
   
10 Dr. 
Smith 
Bob, would one of your classmates be confused? <Confusion 
prompt> 
11 Bob not confused <Self-reported confusion> 
12 Dr. 
Smith 
So Bob, could the researchers have influenced the results? <Forced-
choice question> 
13 Bob C <Correct response> 




After learners indicated that they were ready to continue, they were prompted to 
self-report whether they were confused or not (turns 6-7). Learners were prompted to 
indicate a classmate’s level of confusion, rather than their own (turn 6). The confusion 
prompt was phrased in this manner because it is hypothesized that many learners believe 
that being in a state of confusion is indicative of poor performance or failure. This view 
of confusion during learning could manifest in a reluctance to admit experiences of 
confusion. By prompting learners to indicate a classmate’s confusion, the current thesis 
sought to avoid this biased opinion of confusion. 
 Next, the probe phase occurred. The probe phase (turns 8-9) consisted of learners 
being guided through the evaluation of a second research case study (probe study) by the 
tutor agent. The probe study differed only on surface features from the original study. 
The flawed scientific reasoning topic was the same in both studies. Learners were 
presented with a forced-choice question about the scientific merits of the probe study 
(turn 8) and then provided a response (turn 9). During the probe phase learners did not 
receive feedback on the quality of their response. Instead, the tutor agent only 
acknowledged learners’ responses (e.g., “Ok, Bob, you say A.”). Learners only received 
feedback on the quality of their responses in the manipulation phase to isolate the impact 
of feedback on confusion and induction in learning. If feedback had been delivered 
throughout the training session (e.g., manipulation, probe, and post-remediation phase), it 
would be difficult to determine the impact of accurate inaccurate feedback. 
 Learners then continued on to the remediation phase. During the remediation 
phase, learners were presented with an explanatory text (see Appendix B). The texts 
contained an average of 364 words (SD = 41.7 words) and were adapted from the 
 
27 
electronic textbook that accompanies the ARIES! Intelligent Tutoring System (Millis et 
al., in press). The explanatory text served as a method of remediation by providing 
learners with more information about the topic being discussed; however, the text did not 
directly address the case study being evaluated. 
 Finally, learners began the post-remediation phase (turns 10-13). After reading the 
explanatory text, learners were prompted to self-report their current confusion (turns 10-
11). The forced-choice question presented in the post-remediation phase was the same as 
the forced-choice question in the probe phase (turn 12). Learners responded to the forced-
choice question (turn 13), but did not receive feedback on the quality of their response. 
The tutor agent then summarized the flaw in the first case study presented and moved on 
to the next training session (not shown in Table 1). It is important to note that all 
misleading information was corrected during this summary. 
Procedure 
Learners were individually tested in 2-hour sessions. First, learners signed an 
informed consent and then completed the pretest. Next, learners read a short introductory 
text on scientific reasoning. The introductory text provided learners with a broad 
overview of the scientific reasoning terminology that was discussed during the training 
sessions (control group, experimenter bias, random assignment, replication). Learners 
then began the first of four training sessions. Each training session lasted for 10 minutes 
(SD = 2 min), for an average total interaction of 47 minutes (SD = 8 min). In each 
training session, learners discussed a different scientific reasoning topic and the 
associated case study with the tutor agent. The training session interface is shown in 
Figure 1 and consisted of (A) the tutor agent, (B) a description of the case study, (C) a 
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text-transcript of the dialogue history, and (D) a text-box for learners to enter and submit 
their responses. The tutor agent delivered the content of its utterances via synthesized 
speech, while the human learner typed his or her responses. After completing all four 
training sessions, learners completed the definition posttest and the transfer tasks. Finally, 
learners completed four individual difference measures: School Failure Tolerance (SFT; 
Clifford, 1984), Attributional Complexity Scale (Fletcher, Fernandez, Peterson, & 
Reeder, 1986), Dweck’s intelligence mindset measure (Dweck, 2006), and the Revised 
Causal Dimension Scale (McAuley, Duncan, & Russell, 1992). Learners were fully 
debriefed at the end of the experiment.  
 
                                              Figure 1. Learning Environment 
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Three streams of information were recorded as learners completed the training 
sessions. First, a video of the learner’s face was captured using a web cam. The web cam 
also recorded all audio generated during the interaction. Second, a video of the learner’s 
screen was recorded using a commercially available screen capture program called 
Camtasia StudioTM.  Third, a variety of interaction parameters were automatically 
recorded in log files. These parameters include the learner’s responses (typed responses 
and response times), the tutor’s interpretation of the response (correct or incorrect), and 
the current state of the interaction (pretest vs. training session vs. posttest). 
Results and Discussion 
There were two sets of dependent measures in the present analyses, namely the 
measures from the training session and the summative learning measures (i.e., posttest 
assessments). The impact of learner individual differences on confusion induction and 
learning were not investigated in the current thesis. Due to the repeated measurements 
and nested structure of the data (trials nested within topics, topics nested within 
conditions, and conditions nested within subjects), a mixed-effects modeling approach 
was adopted for all analyses. Mixed-effect modeling is the recommended analysis 
method for this type of data (Pinheiro & Bates, 2000). Mixed-effects models include a 
combination of fixed and random effects and can be used to assess the influence of the 
fixed effects on dependent variables after accounting for any extraneous random effects. 
The lme4 package in R (Bates & Maechler, 2010) was used to perform the requisite 
computations.  
 Linear or logistic models were constructed on the basis of whether the dependent 
variable was continuous or binary. The random effects were: learner (167 levels), topic 
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(4 levels: control group, experimenter bias, random assignment, replication), and order 
(order of presentation of topic). Condition was a four-level (correct-positive, correct-
negative, incorrect-negative, incorrect-positive) categorical fixed effect. The comparisons 
of relevance were correct-negative versus correct-positive and incorrect-positive versus 
incorrect-negative. These comparisons were conducted in order to distinguish between 
the effects of initial response and type of feedback received. For example, when correct-
negative and correct-positive are compared, the only varied element is feedback type; 
however, when correct-negative and incorrect-negative are compared both feedback type 
and initial response differ between the two conditions. If both feedback type and initial 
response are varied, then it is difficult to isolate the impact of false feedback on both 
confusion induction and learning. For this reason, the current thesis will only compare 
learners that initially responded in the same manner. For each dependent measure, then, 
two mixed-effects models were constructed: (1) correct-negative vs. correct-positive and 
(2) incorrect-positive vs. incorrect-negative.   
 To test the confidence moderation hypothesis, additional models were constructed 
that included the interaction term of feedback condition (correct-negative, correct-
positive, incorrect-positive, incorrect-negative) and confidence level (confident, not 
confident). For all of the measures investigated, both the main effect of confidence level 
and the interaction term (feedback x confidence) were not significant predictors. 
Therefore, the subsequent analyses and discussion will focus on feedback condition as 






The discussion of training session results is divided into four sections based on 
the phases of each session: (1) manipulation, (2) probe, (3) remediation, and (4) post-
remediation. Manipulation measures occurred immediately after learners received 
feedback (turns 5 and 7 in Table 2), probe measures involved learner performance on a 
near transfer case study (turn 9 in Table 2), the remediation measure was reading time on 
the explanatory text, and post-remediation measures involved confusion and learner 
performance after reading the explanatory text (turns 11 and 13 in Table 2).  
The training session yielded 665 observations (167 learners x 4 training sessions, 
with 3 observations removed due to experimenter error for each measure. The unit of 
analyses was an individual topic, so there were 665 cases in the data set.  
Manipulation Phase. Manipulation measures included two measures of learners’ 
responses to system feedback. Immediately after receiving feedback, learners were asked 
to indicate when they were ready to proceed with the discussion and to indicate whether 
they were confused or not confused. The length of time that learners took to respond was 
assumed to be indicative of their reaction to the feedback received, with longer latencies 
being affiliated with more confusion.  
All response times were measured in milliseconds. In order to accommodate 
individual differences, all response times were standardized in two ways. First, feedback 
response times and explanatory text reading times were standardized (i.e., converted to z-
scores) for each learner. Second, all times were standardized across task (i.e., feedback 
response time and explanatory text reading time). In this step, response and reading times 
were standardized across learners for each task. This two-step process of standardizing 
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response and reading times allows for differences in individual learner responses (e.g., 
fast vs. slow responders; Step 1) and differences in responding based on the task (e.g., 
reading the explanatory text will most likely take longer than responding to feedback; 
Step 2).  
 Based on the false feedback hypothesis, it was predicted that inaccurate feedback 
would induce confusion in learners. For the two manipulation measures, this means that 
learners in the inaccurate feedback conditions would have longer feedback response 
times and would report more confusion than those in the accurate feedback conditions.  
Two mixed-effects linear regression models with feedback response time as the 
dependent variable revealed that condition was a significant predictor1, but not for both 
comparisons, F(3,665) = 1.52, Mse = 1.03. The coefficients for the models along with the 
mean proportional occurrence (i.e., confusion self-report) or average standardized 
response time (i.e., feedback response time) of each measure are presented in Table 3, 
with significant results bolded (p < .05). Learners in the correct-negative condition took 
significantly longer to respond after receiving feedback than learners in the correct-
positive condition. However, learners who initially responded incorrectly took 
approximately the same amount of time to respond to feedback, regardless of the type of 
feedback received (incorrect-positive = incorrect-negative).  
Learners were then asked to indicate whether they were confused or not confused 
after receiving feedback. Using learners’ self-reported confusion ratings, two mixed-
effects logistic regressions that detected the presence (coded as 1) or absence (coded as 0) 
of confusion were constructed. Similar to feedback response time, learners in the correct-
                                                        
1 Significance of mixed-effects models is evaluated by comparing the mixed-model (fixed + 
random effects) to a random model (random effects only) with a likelihood ratio test. 
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negative condition reported significantly more confusion than those in the correct-
positive condition, χ2(3) = 14.6. The difference between the estimates (i.e., B values) for 
this comparison was 0.814, so learners were e0.814 or 2.3 times more likely to report 
confusion in the correct-negative condition than in the correct-positive condition. 
However, feedback condition was not a significant predictor for learners that initially 
responded incorrectly.  
The findings from the manipulation phase suggest that false feedback was more 
effective when the learner was correct (correct-negative) than when the learner was 
incorrect (incorrect-positive). In other words, learners that were more knowledgeable 
were confused by the false feedback, whereas less knowledgeable learners were not 
confused. This difference can be attributed to the difference between learners’ expected 
outcome and the feedback received from the tutor agent. Prior to receiving feedback, 
learners were required to indicate whether they were confident or not confident in the 
correctness of their response. In general, learners are not very adept at accurately 
monitoring their own knowledge (Dunlosky & Lipko, 2007; Glenberg, Wilkinson, & 
Epstein, 1982; Hacker, Dunlosky, & Graesser, 2009; Maki, 1998). In fact, learners with 
low knowledge are frequently overconfident in their knowledge, whereas learners with 
high knowledge are frequently underconfident (Baker, 1985; Chi, Bassok, Lewis, 
Reimann, & Glaser, 1989; Graesser, Person, & Magliano, 1995; Otero & Graesser, 
2001). However, in the current thesis, all learners were confident in their knowledge. 
Regardless of actual response quality, 80% of learners reported confidence in their 
response correctness. This suggests that most learners believed their responses were 
correct, and expected to receive positive feedback from the agent. When the learners in 
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the correct-negative condition received negative feedback, their expectations were 
violated. However, learners in the incorrect-positive condition had their expectations 
confirmed by the false feedback.  
Probe Phase. Learners were asked to read and diagnose the flaw in a follow-up 
transfer study. The false feedback hypothesis predicted that learners who received 
inaccurate feedback in the manipulation phase would experience greater confusion and 
uncertainty than those that received accurate feedback. From this hypothesis, the current 
thesis predicted that learners in the inaccurate feedback conditions would perform more 
poorly at identifying the flaw in the probe study than those in the accurate feedback 
conditions.  
 Based on the findings of previous confusion induction studies (D’Mello et al., in 
review; Lehman et al., 2011), the current thesis presumed that learners who were 
experiencing uncertainty would answer incorrectly, whereas learners who answered 
correctly were presumed to not be in a state of uncertainty. Logistic regression models 
were used to predict the quality of flaw diagnosis (1 = correct, 0 = incorrect). Table 3 
shows the proportional occurrence for each feedback condition and the model 
coefficients. Feedback condition was a significant predictor of answer quality, indicating 
that learners in both inaccurate feedback conditions performed more poorly than learners 
in the accurate feedback conditions, χ2(3) = 89.8. However, this finding may be 
misleading, as elaborated below.  
When diagnosing the flaw in a study, learners were presented with a three 
alternative forced-choice question. Of the 1,995 responses, learners typically selected 
either the target (correct; 49%) or thematic miss (35%) response options, with fewer 
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instances in which the distractor was selected (16%). When learners received negative 
feedback (regardless of condition), they typically switched between the target and 
thematic miss. In other words, if learners chose the target and then received negative 
feedback, those learners were more likely to choose the thematic miss when diagnosing 
the flaw in the probe phase. Conversely, learners that received positive feedback chose 
the same response option in the probe phase. Thus, response quality might not be 
indicative of uncertainty in the present context, but rather indicated that learners took the 
tutor agent’s feedback seriously and strategically reversed their decisions accordingly.  
Table 3  
Results for Manipulation and Probe Phases 
 
                
  Coefficients (B) 
Measure CN CP IP IN  CN IP 
                
        
Manipulation Phase        
   Feedback Response Latency .055 -.102 .012 .012  .181 .005 
   Confusion: After Feedback .562 .384 .425 .491  .814 -.374 
        
Probe Phase        
   FC Question 2 Answer Quality .234 .619 .281 .563  -1.84 -1.27 
                
Notes. CN: correct-negative; CP: correct-positive; IP: incorrect-positive; IN: incorrect-negative. CP and IN 
were the respective reference groups for the models; hence, coefficients for these conditions are not shown 
in the table. 
Remediation Phase. After the probe phase, learners were provided with an 
explanatory text. The explanatory text was provided as a method of remediation to 
facilitate confusion resolution. The current thesis predicted that learners in the inaccurate 
feedback conditions would read the explanatory text more deeply in an attempt to resolve 
their confusion. This effort was expected to manifest in increased reading times. 
Ultimately, the increased reading time caused by confusion was expected to be beneficial 
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for learning (facilitative confusion hypothesis). Table 4 shows the average reading time 
for each feedback condition as well as the coefficients for each model. 
Two mixed-effects linear regression models were used to predict the length of 
reading time. For learners who initially responded incorrectly (incorrect-positive vs. 
incorrect-negative), feedback condition was not a significant predictor of reading time. 
However, for learners who initially responded correctly (correct-negative vs. correct-
positive), feedback condition was a significant predictor, F(3,665) = 1.61, MSe = .822. 
Learners in the correct-negative condition read the explanatory text for a longer amount 
of time than those in the correct-positive condition. It may be that learners needed to be 
consciously aware of their confusion to actively engage with the text in an attempt to 
resolve their current confusion and reach a better understanding of the scientific 
reasoning topic.  
Post-Remediation Phase. Learner confusion and performance were assessed 
after reading the explanatory texts. The false feedback hypothesis did not have specific 
predictions about the impact of feedback condition on the post-remediation measures. For 
example, learners in the inaccurate feedback conditions could have reported more 
confusion and performed poorly if confusion was not resolved. However, if confusion 
was resolved, learners in the inaccurate feedback conditions could have reported less 
confusion and performed better than the accurate feedback conditions.  
Learner confusion and response quality on flaw diagnosis were the post-
remediation measures. Four mixed-effects models were constructed to test for differences 
based on feedback condition. Logistic regression models were used to detect the presence 
(coded as 1) or absence (coded as 0) of confusion and to predict learner response quality 
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(1= correct, 0 = incorrect). Table 4 shows the proportional occurrence of confusion and 
response quality for each condition along with the coefficients for each model. 
For all post-remediation measures, feedback condition was not a significant 
predictor. Given this finding, the current thesis investigated the impact of explanatory 
text read time on the post-remediation measures. Longer reading times could be 
indicative of the learner attempting to resolve confusion, which is consistent with 
impasse-driven theories of learning (Brown & VanLehn, 1980; VanLehn et al., 2003) and 
thus, our second hypothesis, the facilitative confusion hypothesis. Text read time was 
used as a predictor for the two post-remediation measures. Similar to feedback condition, 
text read time did not significantly predict either of the post-remediation measures. 
Table 4  
Results for Remediation and Post-Remediation Phases 
 
                
  Coefficients (B) 
Measure CN CP IP IN  CN IP 
                
        
Remediation Phase        
   Explanatory Text Read Time .001 -.151 .116 .093  .145 .066 
        
Post-Remediation Phase        
   Confusion: After Intervention .226 .201 .272 .284  .086 -.038 
   FC Question 3 Answer Quality .456 .496 .430 .446  -.219 -.070 
                
Notes. CN: correct-negative; CP: correct-positive; IP: incorrect-positive; IN: incorrect-negative. CP and IN 
were the respective reference groups for the models; hence, coefficients for these conditions are not shown 
in the table. 
Learning Outcomes 
After completing the training sessions for all four scenarios, learning for each 
topic was assessed on a final test at three levels: definition, near transfer, and far transfer. 
For both transfer tasks learner performance was assessed in two ways: hits (correctly 
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identifying the presence of a flaw) and false alarms (correctly identifying the absence of a 
flaw). False alarms allow for an assessment of the degree to which learners are incorrect 
or guessing during the transfer tasks. If there were a significant effect for hit 
performance, then false alarm performance reflected the guessing or incorrect application 
of flaw knowledge. The unit of analysis was the individual topic, resulting in 665 
observations (167 learners x 4 training sessions, with three sessions removed due to 
experimenter error) for the learning outcome measures.  
Feedback Condition. When inaccurate feedback conditions successfully induce 
confusion, this experience of confusion was expected to result in increased learning 
(facilitative confusion hypothesis). Six mixed-effects logistic regression models were 
constructed to predict response quality for the definition, near transfer, and far transfer 
posttests (correct coded as 1, incorrect coded as 0) based on feedback condition. 
Feedback condition was not a significant predictor of learner performance on any of the 
posttest assessments. This finding likely occurred because these models did not 
distinguish between cases in which learners were confused or not confused during the 
training session. However, this finding does show that providing inaccurate feedback was 
not detrimental to learning (when misleading information is corrected).  
Confusion Resolution. Although feedback condition did not yield assessment 
differences in the final test, the current thesis also hypothesized that experiences of 
confusion and confusion resolution would positively impact learning (facilitative 
confusion hypothesis). Therefore, an analysis was performed to investigate whether final 
test performance was predicted by confusion resolution. Specifically, the current thesis 
predicted that learners who resolved their confusion would outperform learners that 
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remain in a state of confusion. Confusion resolution was defined as the change in self-
reported confusion from time 1 (after feedback) to time 2 (after text reading). There were 
four levels of resolution: no confusion (not confused at time 1 or time 2, with 289 
observations), confusion resolved (confused at time 1 and not confused at time 2, with 
214 observations), confusion unresolved (confused at time 1 and time 2, with 99 
observations), and confusion created (not confused at time 1 but confused at time 2, with 
63 observations).  
Mixed-effects logistic regression models were constructed to predict learner 
performance on the three posttests based on confusion resolution. Learners who resolved 
their confusion performed better than those with unresolved confusion or no confusion (p 
< .1) on the definition posttest, χ2(3) = 4.08. However, confusion resolution was not a 
significant predictor for the near transfer, χ2(3) = 2.89, p = .408, or far transfer tasks, 
χ2(3) = .447, p = .930. These results suggest that confusion resolution did not facilitate 
deeper learning in the present study. 
Feedback Condition and Self-Reported Confusion Interaction. It is possible 
that learners must consciously recognize their confusion in order to begin engaging in 
beneficial cognitive activities (VanLehn et al. 2003). This is also consistent with the 
facilitative confusion hypothesis because it is possible that the cognitive activities 
triggered by confusion are enough to promote learning. To address this possibility, 
differences in learning outcomes based on self-reported confusion after feedback were 
investigated. This was investigated with six mixed-effects models with condition, self-
reported confusion, and the condition × confusion interaction term. There were no 
significant main effects for condition or confusion, but the interaction term was 
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significant. However, the interaction was only significant for the far transfer task, χ2(7) = 
23.3.  
 The interaction was deciphered by regressing far transfer performance on the 
confused and not confused cases separately. Of the 665 total observations, learners 
reported confusion in 313 cases, and did not report being confused in 352 cases. The 
models for the not confused cases were only significant for the correct-negative and 
correct-positive comparison. Learners in the correct-negative condition performed 
significantly worse than the correct-positive condition when they did not report 
experiencing confusion. For the confused cases, both models were significant. When they 
reported confusion, learners in both inaccurate feedback conditions performed 
significantly better than those in the accurate feedback conditions (see Table 5). In other 
words learners who received inaccurate feedback were 2.7 (correct-negative; B = 1.02; 
e1.02 = 2.7) and 2.4 (incorrect-positive; B = .867; e.867 = 2.4) times more likely to detect a 












Table 5  
Performance on Learning Measures as a Function of Self-Reported Confusion 
 
                
 Proportional Occurrence  Coefficients (B) 
Learning Measure CN CP IP IN  CN IP 
                
Definition        
     Not Confused .529 .637 .558 .453  -.263 .249 
     Confused .660 .593 .557 .550  -.055 .220 
Near Transfer: Hit        
     Not Confused .439 .500 .470 .413  -.047 .384 
     Confused .439 .379 .548 .534  .201 .206 
Far Transfer: Hit        
     Not Confused .112 .261 .235 .310  -1.16 -.410 
     Confused .268 .121 .413 .246  1.02 .867 
Far Transfer: False Alarm        
     Not Confused .163 .126 .129 .161  .044 -.028 
     Confused .166 .083 .144 .124  .078 .016 
                
Notes. CN: correct-negative; CP: correct-positive; IP: incorrect-positive; IN: incorrect-negative. CP and IN 
were the respective reference groups for the models; hence, coefficients for these conditions are not shown 
in the table. 
 Far transfer tests are the gold standard for learning because they challenge 
learners to apply their new knowledge to a new situation. Our results therefore suggest 
that providing false feedback can have a positive effect on learning, but only if the 
feedback manipulation is successful in triggering an impasse and the resultant confusion. 
It is also important to note that there were no significant differences between the 
inaccurate and accurate feedback conditions on far transfer false alarm responses. Thus, it 
is not the case that the enhanced performance for learners in the inaccurate feedback 
conditions was due to guessing.  
Conclusion 
In the last decade research has shown that learning is an emotional experience and 
that emotions play an important role in the learning process (Arroyo et al., 2009; 
Burleson & Picard, 2007; Chaffar, Derbalie, & Frasson, 2009; Conati & Maclaren, 2009; 
 
42 
Craig et al., 2004; D’Mello, in review; D’Mello et al., 2009; Forbes-Riley & Litman, 
2009; Graesser et al., 2007; Pekrun, 2010; Robison, McQuiggan, & Lester, 2009; Smith 
& Kirby, 2009). Some learning environments have even begun to adaptively respond to 
learner emotions in an attempt to facilitate learning (Arroyo et al., 2009; D’Mello et al., 
2009; D’Mello et al., 2011; Litman & Forbes-Riley, 2006). Whereas these systems are 
reacting to the emotions of learners, this thesis is taking another approach to emotions 
and learning. Specifically, this thesis investigated the utility of proactively inducing 
emotional states that are related to positive learning outcomes. The reported experiment 
is part of a larger research project investigating confusion induction during learning. 
Previously, confusion has been induced through the presentation of system breakdowns 
(D’Mello & Graesser, in review) and contradictory information (D’Mello et al., in 
review; Lehman et al., 2011). The current thesis explored the utility of false system 
feedback as another medium for confusion induction.  
Alignment of Findings with Hypotheses 
 The thesis tested three hypotheses that relate to confusion induction and the 
relationship between confusion and learning within a learning environment that discussed 
scientific reasoning topics. First, the current thesis tested the false feedback hypothesis 
and found evidence that supported false feedback as an effective method for confusion 
induction. Self-reported confusion after receiving feedback revealed that false feedback 
was effective for inducing confusion. A more objective indicator of confusion (feedback 
response time) supported the false feedback hypothesis as well. However, false feedback 
was not successful in all situations. It appears that false feedback was more effective 
when learners were correct than when they were incorrect.  
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 It is also important to note that confusion was induced through events that were 
tied to the learning process (i.e., feedback). This can be contrasted with task independent 
methods of induction that have been used in previous research such as having learners 
watch an emotion-inducing video (Rottenberg, Ray, & Gross, 2007). However, much of 
the research using emotion-inducing videos has been limited to Ekman’s (1973) “basic” 
emotions, so a direct comparison for confusion induction is not currently possible. This is 
particularly important for the incorporation of confusion induction into learning 
environments that aim to regulate the induced confusion. 
 Regarding the second hypothesis, the current thesis investigated the potential 
moderating effect of learner confidence on confusion induction (confidence moderation 
hypothesis). Unfortunately, the current experiment did not support learner confidence as a 
moderator for confusion induction. However, it is still possible that confidence will be a 
moderating factor on confusion induction, if learners are capable of more accurately 
monitoring their own knowledge. It is possible that the learning scenario in the current 
research is not high stakes enough for learners to truly be introspective and reflect on 
their level of confidence. It is also possibly that the method in which confidence was 
assessed (offering learners the option to change their response), was not appropriate. 
Perhaps if learners were placed into a more game-like scenario in which they won or lost 
points based on both the quality of their answer and their confidence level would result in 
a more accurate assessment of learner confidence.  
 For the facilitative confusion hypothesis, false feedback and confusion were 
expected to influence learning. Contrary to impasse-driven theories of learning (Brown & 
VanLehn, 1980; VanLehn et al., 2003), it was not the resolution of confusion that 
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predicted learning; rather, it was the experience of confusion that had the strongest effect 
on learning. Cognitive disequilibrium theory proposes that the shift from equilibrium to 
disequilibrium triggers a set of cognitive activities to restore equilibrium (Caroll & Kay, 
1988; Graesser & Olde, 2003; Siegler & Jenkins, 1989). From the results in the present 
experiment and past findings (D’Mello & Graesser, in review; D’Mello et al., in review; 
Lehman et al., 2011), it appears that it may be enough to simply trigger the cognitive 
activities associated with equilibrium restoration. Thus, our second hypothesis 
(facilitative confusion) was partially supported. Learners that received false feedback and 
were consciously aware of their confusion during the training session were ultimately 
more successful at applying scientific reasoning skills to new research case studies. 
 For learning environments to take advantage of the benefits of confusion, they 
must be able to induce, track, and regulate learner experiences of confusion. In the false 
feedback learning environment the current thesis has attempted to address all three tasks. 
Confusion was induced through false system feedback, tracked by self-reports, and 
regulated by attempting to facilitate confusion resolution with an explanatory text.  
Limitations and Future Directions 
There are four main limitations to the present research that need to be addressed 
in future experiments. First, some critics might object to providing learners with 
inaccurate feedback due to the potential for negative impacts on learning. Although this is 
a legitimate concern, it is not warranted for the present research for three reasons: (a) all 
misleading information was corrected at the end of each training session, (b) learners 
were fully debriefed at the end of the experiment, and (c) there were no signs of negative 
impacts on learning. In fact, learners who received inaccurate feedback generally 
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performed comparably to those that received accurate feedback, with one exception, and 
in some circumstances outperformed learners receiving accurate feedback.  
 The second limitation pertains to tracking confusion during the training session. 
Previous research reported that performance on forced-choice questions during the 
training session was indicative of learners’ uncertainty (D’Mello et al., in review; 
Lehman et al., 2011). However, in the present research the forced-choice questions posed 
to learners were not a reliable source. Instead, learner self-reports were used as an 
indication of experiences of confusion. Although learner self-reports are a subjective 
measure, the findings were supported by a more objective measure (feedback response 
time). It is possible that performance on the forced-choice questions was not effective in 
the present experiment because of the way in which forced-choice questions were 
designed. In particular, the answer options may have not been sufficiently sensitive to 
reveal confusion.   
 Third, attempts to regulate confusion were limited in the present research due to 
the nature of the remediation method. The explanatory text provided only broad, general 
information about the topic, but did not directly address the case study being discussed. 
Consequently, the remediation method was passive, in the sense that learners had to 
actively engage with the text on their own (e.g., make inferences, compare new 
information to their existing mental models, modify their existing mental models, etc.). 
This can be contrasted with a more active type of remediation, such as adaptive 
scaffolding and misconception correction by a pedagogical agent or human tutor. As 
previously mentioned, the explanatory texts were not tailored to the case studies being 
discussed. Thus, the texts contained both relevant and irrelevant information for the task 
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of flaw diagnosis. The irrelevant information may have caused interference for learners 
and limited successful confusion resolution and increased learning from this remediation 
method. The current thesis hypothesizes that more adaptive and targeted forms of 
remediation that help learners regulate and potentially resolve confusion will further 
increase learning.  
 Finally, the present findings are limited because they were found in only one 
experiment and were not replicated. A replication of the present findings is therefore 
warranted. A follow-up experiment is planned to investigate the impact of false feedback 
within a learning environment that involves a trialogue (tutor agent, peer student agent, 
and human learner) discussion of scientific reasoning topics. This second experiment will 
allow for further evaluation of false feedback as a method for confusion induction and 
determination of the circumstances under which it is effective. 
Concluding Remarks 
 The current thesis has described a learning environment that takes a proactive role 
in the learning process by inducing confusion. The next step in this line of research is to 
determine the most effective ways to help learners regulate their confusion. There are 
many potential interventions that could be used to convert these learning opportunities in 
to actual learning gains (Lehman et al., in press). It is unlikely that a one-size fits-all 
intervention exists for confusion regulation. Therefore, future research will need to 
determine not only the types of interventions, but also the learners’ individual differences 
that contribute to the effectiveness of each intervention. Once the learning interventions 
and learner characteristics have been identified, a learning environment can be designed 
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that induces a beneficial emotional state for learning and provides adaptive, 
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Original Study (inappropriate control group): 
There was a study where subjects took this new diet pill called 'Pounds Off' and said that 
they lost on average 10 pounds in the first month of taking it. The article said that none of 
the participants exercised or ate super healthy or anything, they just acted normally while 
taking the pill. They even compared it to another group of people who didn’t take the pill 
and just acted how they normally do. That group didn’t lose any weight. So Pounds Off 
works like ten times as well as not doing anything. 
 
Near Transfer Study: 
So there's this great new pill that completely clears up your complexion, practically 
overnight no more acne! Researchers did a study on "Zit-B-Gone" and found that people 
who took it had no more acne after just two days. The article said that everyone in the 
study stopped using any face masks or special face washes when they started taking "Zit-
B-Gone". All they did was rinse their face with water twice a day. There was another 
group of people who didn't take" Zit-B-Gone" and continued with their normal routines 
for washing their faces. The group that didn't take "Zit-B-Gone" had no reduction in their 
acne after two days. So "Zit-B-Gone" is like a new miracle acne treatment! 
 
Far Transfer Study: 
A trainer developed a new system that will have your dog well behaved over night. Lots 
of people have been using videos to train their dogs at home; this new system will get 
people to bring their dogs to the kennel. It combines traditional reinforcement and 
hypnotherapy. Dogs go through an intensive eight-hour session on basic commands 
(reinforcement). Then while the dogs sleep a tape is played that says the command, 
correct behavior, and praise (hypnosis). The trainers tested this with two groups, one did 
the new system (reinforcement + hypnosis) and the other group used the training videos 
at home (video). At the completion of each training type the dogs were evaluated on their 
behavior. The dogs that did the new system (reinforcement + hypnosis) did the best and it 
took less than 24 hours! One trainer tried out this system at another kennel. The new 
system didn’t work as well at this new kennel, but it still worked better than the training 





Experimenter Bias Explanatory Text 
 
One of the easiest factors of the environment to control is the effect of the researcher or 
experimenter. We know from several experiments, that the behavior or expectations of a 
researcher can have a significant impact on the results of an experiment. When this 
happens, it is not possible to determine whether the results were due to the independent 
variable or to actions of the experimenter. There are two important flaws to consider here. 
The first type of flaw focuses on our motivation (conscious or unconscious) to bias the 
results; the second type of flaw focuses on our ability to bias the results. 
Conflict of interest occurs when a researcher has a strong investment (fame or 
fortune) in a particular outcome of the experiment. This is a problem because the 
researcher may intentionally or unintentionally bias the experiment. For example, if we 
were conducting an experiment on the benefits of exercise on memory and we were paid 
by an exercise equipment company, we could have a conflict of interest. You should 
know that a conflict of interest doesn’t guarantee that a researcher will bias the results, 
but it creates a situation in which a researcher is more motivated to influence the 
outcome. 
Opportunity for bias is a flaw in which the experimenter does not take important 
precautions to reduce his or her chances of affecting the behavior of the participants. The 
best precaution is using a double-blind technique in which both the researcher and the 
participant are unaware of which condition the participant is in. A second method is to 
reduce contact with the participants. Most experiments are automated so that a computer 
presents the instructions rather than the experimenter doing so. A third method is to use 
automated or objective scoring of data. If that is not possible, then two raters should score 
all data independently (inter-rater reliability) without knowing the participant’s condition 
(double-blind). For our memory experiment, if we use a recall rather then multiple choice 
test of memory, then the experimenter will have to determine which recall responses are 
correct and which are incorrect. This is an opportunity for bias. Therefore, two raters who 
are unaware of conditions should be used. We need to reduce the opportunity and 
motivation for experimenters to bias the results of an experiment, or we will not be able 
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